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Niels P. Petersson, Stig Tenold and Nicholas J. White
Global history, transnational history and the history of globalization are
among the key trends in historiography over the past two decades.1 To an
extent, these are fashionable buzzwords, made attractive and plausible by
1For a recent discussion of approaches to global history, see Osterhammel (2019).
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our present-day experience of ever-increasing connections across countries
and continents. But these trends have also helped enrich historiography
by opening up new areas of study and encouraging historians to ask new
questions and transcend boundaries not just of a geographical but also of
a disciplinary nature. The challenges of getting to grips with a range of
new phenomena and topics havemade historiansmore open towards com-
bining social, cultural, political and economic approaches and encouraged
dialogue with neighbouring disciplines. In particular, interest in economic
history has increased due to the obvious importance that businesses, mar-
kets, infrastructures, and economic policies have had for global flows of
all kinds.
Deep-sea shipping is inextricably linked to notions of transnational-
ism and globalization. Over centuries, transnational and transcontinental
spaces were opened up by ships and defined by shipping routes.2 The inte-
gration of theworld economy andworldmarkets in the nineteenth century
has been explained by the impact of low-cost transportationmade possible
by the introduction of steamships.3 In his excellent history of Europe and
the maritime world, Michael Miller presents maritime infrastructures as
an essential ingredient in all key processes of twentieth-century history.4
At the same time, historians have studied the transformation of shipping
from an activity recognizably anchored in specific nation-states into ‘the
world’s most global industry’.5 Thus, the history of shipping can illustrate
and illuminate the characteristics of different periods in the history of
globalization6 and help explain the changes that occurred.
This volume focuses on the transformations of the second half of the
twentieth century. There has been considerable discussion on periodiza-
tion as well as on how to characterize changes that have been summed up
as the ‘shock of the global’.7 For both purposes, the question of continuity
and change in the run-up to present-day globalization has been important.
ForMiller, the transnationalism of themaritimeworld and its cross-border
2Fusaro and Polónia (2010).
3Kaukiainen (2006), Kaukiainen (2012), Harley (2008), and O’Rourke and Williamson (1999).
4Miller (2012, 3).
5Kaukiainen (2008) and Tenold (2019).
6Hopkins (2002) and Osterhammel and Petersson (2005).
7Ferguson et al. (2010).
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networks underpins the continuity of globalization throughout the twen-
tieth century, including the interwar years that are often regarded as a
period of deglobalization.8 Nonetheless, Miller also sees a switch, in the
final third of the twentieth century, from networks that were Eurocen-
tric, imperial, and fragmented to ones that were multipolar and almost
seamlessly global. His account of the relationship between shipping and
globalization in the twentieth century is a story of progressions and muta-
tions rather than interruptions and new beginnings.9 Miller focuses on
the expertise that was available to overcome obstacles to global flows—but
it is equally possible to highlight instead the variety and importance of
such obstacles, and how they fell away once the old world of protected
national markets, cargo liners and conferences gave way to that of liberal-
ized world trade, container ships and cut-throat competition.10 We have
to take a closer look at particular contexts, companies and connections
and find out about mutations, interruptions and new beginnings and how
they relate to the wider histories of globalizations.
Contexts
Highly important in these mutations, interruptions and new beginnings
were the process of decolonization and the accompanying economic
nationalism (not just in the developing world but in the US and the Soviet
bloc too, and supported by the UN’s drive towards trying to create a more
egalitarian world-trading regime from the 1960s). This was hardly sur-
prising since, as Tenold argues in his overarching chapter, European, and
especially British, dominance at the beginning of the twentieth century in
global shippingwas due to a ‘leading positionwithin production and trade’
and ‘superior access to technology, capital [including human know-how]
and sufficiently skilled labour’ but also ‘imperial ambitions and structures
that ensured political support for maritime activities’. Before World War
8Miller (2012, 6, 11). For a different discussion of changes and continuities in interwar global
networks, see Dejung and Petersson (2013, 12–16).
9Miller (2012, 12).
10Levinson (2006).
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II it was only Japan outside Europe which proved capable of breaking into
this maritime system through a combination of defensive industrialization
and defensive imperialism.11
With a few exceptions, such as Singapore’s Neptune Orient Line, new
national shipping lines were often ineffective in the longer-term. Yet, the
efforts of European shipping companies to manoeuvre around obstacles
(both real and perceived) in the decolonized world led onto the adoption
of containerization (asWhite demonstrates in the British case). This was a
new beginning which suggests that, as Tenold also stresses in his chapter,
European shipping companies were innovative and adaptive, for example,
employing multinational crews and exploiting liberalized trading regimes,
and that entrepreneurial/commercial stasis was not the crucial factor in
European decline as Sturmey once argued in the British case.12 As distinct
from European shipbuilders, European shipping firms inTenold’s schema
continued to play ‘a crucial, albeit reduced, role’. This is a theme explored
further in the ‘companies’ part of this volume. Moreover, while part of the
OCL strategy after 1965 was to defend imperial market shares, notably
in the politically stable and culturally familiar old Dominions, diversifica-
tion and redeployment by Britain’s leading shipowners also represented a
chance to tap further into the dynamic Asia-Pacific trading and investment
realm. That reflected not only a quantitative upsurge in world trade but
also a qualitative shift in which the real value-added in global trade was
now to be found in increased exchanges between industrialized countries
rather than between European industrial and financial ‘metropoles’ and
primary-producing ‘peripheries’ in the developing world.13
This trend towards global intra-industrial trade reinforces Tenold’s
‘swing to the East’ and his emphasis in this collection on the changing
gravity of the world economy as western Europe lost its hegemony in both
ocean-going shipping and shipbuilding (but particularly the latter and for
Britain most starkly). Japan had already surpassed the UK in 1956 as the
world’s leading shipbuilder, and that was followed from the mid-1970s by
11On Japan’s defensive modernization and imperialism, see Young (2018, 216).
12Sturmey (1962/2010).
13Hopkins (2002) and Cain and Hopkins (2016, 714–717).
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South Korea and subsequently China. Asian dominance by the twenty-
first century, as Tenold tells us, was even greater than Europe’s had proved
a century earlier. In the maritime industries, at least, Asia finally caught up
from Pomeranz’s ‘Great Divergence’ in which, around 1800, well-placed
coal supplies and resource-rich colonies across the Atlantic allowed the
western rather than the eastern end of Eurasia to suddenly and unexpect-
edly leap forward. In this bit of geographical luck, the particularly ‘fortu-
nate freak’ was Britain. Highly significant for later maritime dominance
was that Britain’s plentiful coal supplies were close to lots of water and
conveniently-located ports which made steam power cost-effective. Plan-
tations in the Americas, meanwhile, provided a superabundance of raw
materials for further industrialization as well as the development of ocean-
going maritime trade.14 In what might be termed a ‘Great Convergence’,
Tenold shows that East Asians had acquired capital and skills to succeed in
shipping by the later twentieth century. Transnational business networks
in the burgeoning intra-Asian economy, government support, low wages,
limited unionization, reliable domestic supplies of steel, and easily trans-
ferrable technology allowed for the emergence of large-scale and globally
competitive Asian shipbuilding. To maintain competitiveness, European
shipping companies turned to Japanese yards for the building of their
vessels—as early as 1965 for Blue Funnel, Britain’s leading cargo line in
East and Southeast Asia, and even earlier in the late-1950s for the Greek
bulk carriers (asHarlaftis’s andTsakas’s chapter in this volume illustrates).15
As Tenold argues, the draw towards Asia entailed considerable ‘dislo-
cation’ effects in the combination of production creation and production
diversion that characterized post-war globalization. That mirrors Levin-
son’s notion that containerization broke the link between ports and pro-
duction centres—the ultimate ‘shock city’ of this post-colonial deglobal-
ization in the 1970s and 1980s probably being Liverpool whose position
as the second city of the British Empire had been based upon the port’s
14Pomeranz (2000, 207) and Perdue (2000, 1–3).
15White and Evans (2016, 233).
254 N. P. Petersson et al.
proximity to northern England’s manufacturing powerhouse and a ship-
building complex at Birkenhead.16 At a geo-political level, the ‘Global
Cold War’ can be brought into this transnational maritime narrative too
because, as also addressed byTenold, the Japanese and South Korean take-
off in shipbuilding was greatly assisted by US aid, investment and tech-
nology transfer in the broader context of containing Communist China.17
What emerges equally from the ‘contexts’ section of this volume, is
the reduced (or, at least, changing) role of the nation-state in the post-
war globalization of the maritime industries. The shift towards a more
‘conglomeratic approach’ in the regulation of maritime shipping, Reil-
ing points out, was reflective itself of the decline of state supervision at
a national level and the multinational nature of shipping through flags
of convenience and open registries. Also stressed by Tenold, these are
developments in business forms which make it difficult to precisely iden-
tify ownership patterns and, hence, the European share in shipping, the
decline of which was offset by European-owned vessels flying foreign flags.
On top of this, was the internationalization of cargoes and crews. As Har-
laftis’s and Tsakas’s chapter shows, Greek shipowners-cum-shipbuilders
pioneered these business practices in ‘mammoth’ bulk carriage (especially
oil, the new preferred fuel of post-colonial globalization) in the 1940s and
1950s. That additionally involved a considerable internationalization of
capital in shipping as the Greeks contracted with American oil companies,
utilized US bank finance and invested in American and later northern
European shipyards. White’s discussion of Nigeria shows that multina-
tional crewing was hardly unknown under the old globalization and the
politicization of non-European seafarers, as well as dockworkers, should
not be neglected in explaining increasing costs. But, in the British case,
the use of Nigerian, Kru, Lascar, Malay and Chinese crews (many of the
latter from Singapore and Hong Kong) was clearly linked to empire. The
more recent widespread use of Filipino labour, for example, in interna-
tional shipping emphasizes this multinationalization and the decoupling
of colonialism and maritime dominance.18
16Levinson (2006), D’Eramo (2015), and Lane (1997).
17Westad (2005), Forsberg (2000), and Duara (2011).
18Alderton et al. (2004), Ruggunan (2011) and Swift (2011).
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The transboundary, de-territorialized nature of shipping and multiple
actors involved, in which open registries had ‘neither the capacity nor
inclination’ to provide regulation frameworks, led, as Reiling shows, to a
parallelmultiplication andbroadening out of standard-setting andquality-
monitoring bodies. These took a particular role in labour, safety and eco-
logical issues and encompassed international organizations (often under
UN auspice), regional bodies like the EU, port-based public authorities,
transnational classification societies and P&I clubs. This medley of regu-
latory inputs and oversight bodies was a far cry from the self-governance
of the European-dominated liner conference system of the old ‘colonial’
globalization.
This is not to say that the nation state disappeared. White’s analysis of
British containerization points to the central role in the 1960s and 1970s
of governmental actors in the assertive ex-Dominions and in Southeast
Asia (and later in Sri Lanka as well). Tenold also notes the ‘controlled
economic development model’ in the East Asian NICs. Furthermore, as
Reiling emphasizes, there are still ‘many weak points’ in international reg-
ulation which have tended to set minimum standards only and in which
implementation still relies on individual states and ‘opting out’ remains
more than possible. The latter phenomenon is indicated in White’s dis-
cussion of the limitations of the UNCTAD liner code, and the US’s non-
compliance during the 1980s. EEC reservations, meanwhile, ‘disappl[ied]
crucial parts of the Code to trades between EECmembers and, on a recip-
rocal basis, between EEC members and the OECD countries’. An EEC
regulation, moreover, required that ‘shippers and ship-owners of Mem-
ber States shall not insist on applying the procedures for settling disputes
provided for in…the Code’. As Sturmey argued, these revisions effectively
jettisoned ‘the fundamental principle of the equality of the two groups of
lines of the trading partners in trades with developing countries’.19 This
suggests that the convergence (or equalization) of shipping relationships
between Europe and the developing world in post-war globalization have
been limited. Indeed, in 1983, an angry Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s
Prime Minister, accused western governments of obstructing UNCTAD
and denying developing countries the opportunity to carry more freight
19Sturmey (1986, 197).
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on their own ships.20 AsO’Brien argued in reviewing the historiographical
debate (ten years on) from the publication of Pomeranz’s influential book,
the ‘Great Divergence’ between western Europe and East Asia remained
‘important for social scientists to address simply because it is still with us
as a North-South divide’.21
Nor was the global shock, as far as western Europe was concerned,
that immediate. Tenold shows that Europe’s leading maritime position at
the start of the twentieth century was maintained well into the post-war
period with Britain, ‘the retired empire-builder’, continuing to control the
world’s largest fleet at the end of the 1960s. This lag time suggests that a
combination of the old and the new globalization characterized the post-
war era for at least a quarter of a century. Itwas not until themid-1970s that
Asia’s new found shipping and shipbuilding advantages became manifest.
The big spur here were the OPEC-induced oil price hikes (indicative
themselves of a greater balancing and multi-centring of global economics
and politics as extra-European producers used their collective muscle in
the wake of decolonization). Reiling, likewise, finds that it was not until
the 1970s that the conglomeratic approach in maritime regulation tended
to replace the flag-state principle and when key IMO interventions were
accepted and adopted.
To recap thenon contexts,what does shipping/shipbuilding tell us about
post-war globalization? Shipping has clearly been an important factor in
the changing gravity of the world economy and the changed significance
of the nation state. The declining role of Europe in the international
economy is starkly illustrated by Tenold’s data on the world’s largest ports
(in 1910 more than half of the world’s 15 busiest ports by cargo volume
were European; one hundred years later, there was only one European
port in the top 15). In Reiling’s analysis, meanwhile, new conceptions
of maritime international law are a key example of global governance in
a ‘typically globalized industry’. Yet, disengagement from pre-war colo-
nial structures and patterns was not as complete as might be suggested
20Central Intelligence Agency (United States ), EA 83-10111, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of
East Asian Analysis, ‘Malaysia: Economic Policy at the Crossroads’, 8 June 1983.
21O’Brien (2010).
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in the term ‘post-colonial globalization’. Indeed, Darwin defined decolo-
nization in the 25 years after 1945 as ‘a partial retraction, redeployment
and redistribution of British and European influences in the regions of the
extra-European world whose economic, political and cultural life had pre-
viously seemed to flow intoWesternmoulds’.22 Periodization and chronol-
ogy remain important, therefore, and the broad brush stroke concept of a
distinctive ‘post-war globalization’ requires modification. In shipping, the
1970s seem to be the breakpoint rather than 1945 or 1990 (as Baldwin’s
study of information technology suggests for the ‘Great Convergence’
between ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’).23
Yet, the changing nature of business models in which international
shipping companies seized upon the opportunities provided by tax havens
and off-shore companies, and their investors became more short-termist
and profit-oriented and less community-centred, appears to have a longer
trajectory. That stretched back to the 1940s and 1950s with innovations
introduced by the Greek shipping barons. Moreover, the nationality of
those European companies which succeeded in the post-colonial maritime
world—the cross-traders of Greece and Scandinavia notably—did not
come with the old ‘imperial’ baggage.24 This points to the agency of
shipping companies in these transformations, as well as the forging of
new connections, which are the next two themes of our conclusion.
Companies
Business historians have long stressed the crucial role private firms and
entrepreneurs played in economic globalization through their decisions to
invest, adopt new technologies, or seek out new markets. Shipping firms
have been singled out as key drivers of economic globalization.25 The
companies examined in this volume contributed and reacted to globaliza-
tion in a variety of ways, and some did so more successfully than others.
22Darwin (1988, 7).
23Baldwin (2016).
24In cruising, meanwhile, it has been American ‘parvenus’ who have come to dominate. Miller
(2012, 326–330).
25Boon (2017), Ekberg and Lange (2014), Jones (2002), and Miller (2012).
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In the 1950s, shipping entrepreneurs began ordering supertankers and
large bulk carriers, and created new blueprints for global business organi-
zation that appeared exotic to some, illicit to others, but eventually were
widely adopted within and beyond the shipping world.26 In the 1960s,
liner shipping firms had to respond to decolonization and developmental-
ist economic nationalism, while also engaging with the technological and
strategic challenges of the container revolution.27 The 1970s brought a
muchmore difficult environment withmacroeconomic instability, stagfla-
tion and currency fluctuations. Rising costs, overcapacity and increased
competition were the key challenges shipping firms had to face, and their
responses led to a fundamental transformation of the international ship-
ping industry. Container transport gained in importance over the 1980s
and by the 1990s became a key ingredient in the global integration of pro-
duction chains spurred on by economic liberalization, while tanker and
bulk shipping grew in response to the rising industrial economies’ hunger
for raw materials.
Business history focuses on corporate success and failure and the reasons
behind it.The three chapters in the ‘companies’ section invite approaching
this issue via a comparison of the very different strategies and trajectories of
three container shipping firms. Ocean / OCL,28 EAC andMaersk differed
in their basic approaches to containerization; in the timing ofmarket entry
and (in the case of Ocean and EAC) market exit; in the resources they
could draw on and chose to develop; in the resulting organizational ability
to control and coordinate operations effectively on a global scale; in overall
corporate strategy; and in the extent to which their strategies and strengths
were compatible with a changing external environment. Perhaps the most
obvious difference between the three companies lies in where they ended
up: Maersk nowadays is well known as the world’s largest liner shipping
firm with well over 600 ships, including ‘megaships’ of over 18,000 TEU
carrying capacity. Ocean and OCL no longer exist as corporate entities;
Ocean sold its stake in OCL in 1986, abandoned its shipping activities
26See the chapter by Gelina Harlaftis and Christos Tsakas in this volume.
27See the chapters by Martin Jes Iversen, Niels P. Petersson, Henrik Sornn-Friese and Nicholas J.
White in this volume.
28Overseas Container Lines (OCL) was a joint venture established by Ocean, P&O, Furness Withy
and British & Commonwealth in 1965.
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and developed into a successful logistics business that was acquired by
DHL in 2000, while OCL ended up as part of P&O and, ultimately,
Maersk. EAC, meanwhile, also left shipping, selling its fleet to Maersk in
1997 and never really recovering from the losses incurred in shipping.
DidMaersk succeed where others failed, and get things right that others
got wrong? And, if so, can any of the differences between the three com-
panies be singled out as decisive? Did Maersk, for example, benefit from
being a ‘late mover’ into containerization? OCL certainly incurred its fair
share of learning costs as a result of being an early mover. Technologies
and processes had to be developed from scratch, and new terminals and
facilities built in Europe, Australia and East Asia.29 Maersk moved into
the market once such teething problems had been overcome, and once
major port operators had begun building the infrastructure required to
handle large-scale container flows. On the other hand, OCL remarkably
soon became a successful and profitable operation, which suggests that
both early and late entry into the market may have represented viable
strategies. (In contrast to EAC, Ocean also proved rather adept at exiting
the market as both the sale of OCL and later the takeover of Ocean by
DHL were very profitable for the shareholders.)
Were Maersk superior in exploiting and nurturing corporate resources?
A slightly flippant point about resources is that it always helps to own
an oil well—and Maersk were a large player in the oil business until
they decided to focus exclusively on container shipping in 2017.30 More
seriously, containerization represented investment on a much larger scale
than liner shipping companies were used to, and neitherOcean, who in the
late 1960s were sitting on substantial reserves and unused tax allowances,
nor Maersk faced significant financial constraints when they decided to
containerize. OCL’s fortunes changed in the early 1970s when Ocean and
its other three parent companies decided that they wanted OCL to pay
dividends rather than reinvest and expand. From then on,OCL’s frustrated
managers described their business model as simply ‘a milch cow followed
29See Niels P. Petersson’s chapter in this volume and Bott (2009).
30As of the time of writing, Maersk were planning to complete the sale of Maersk Oil to Total
and offering their other oil-related businesses for sale: https://www.maersk.com/news/2018/06/29/
values-and-opportunities (last viewed 1 February 2019).
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by a coffin’.31 EAC, during the same period, were also held back by the
debt taken on to build the Liner Replacement Vessels, a type of ship that
turned out to be unsuited to the market.32 Thus, from the mid-1970s,
OCL and EAC faced tighter restrictions on the investment they could
undertake in container shipping than Maersk.
For business historians, the notionof corporate resources covers farmore
than material and financial ones. Explicit and implicit knowledge, corpo-
rate culture, and the often elusive ‘dynamic capabilities’ are all equally
important. The shipping industry did not invent the systematic nurturing
of corporate resources, but the three firms examined here certainly went
with the times, applying professional management methods, adopting
modern personnel development systems, introducing the latest informa-
tion technologies, and making use of other innovations as they became
available. Both Maersk and Ocean placed great value on systematically
increasing efficiency and quality throughout all business processes, as cap-
tured in Maersk’s slogan ‘service all the way’, and both firms seem to
have believed that globally integrated, standardized operations, reporting
and control were required to achieve this. In contrast, EAC, rather than
aiming to build a standardized, frictionless operation on a global scale,
seem to have continued to rely on decentralized ad hoc problem-solving,
assuming that significant friction as a result of technological, political and
administrative obstacles was unavoidable in maritime transport.
Control and coordination, emphasized so much byMaersk and Ocean,
seem to have played an important role both in turning shipping firms
into powerful engines of global economic integration and in making their
operations profitable. Moreover, institutional and organizational factors
also played a role in strategic decision-making far removed from day-to-
day business. Of the three companies, Maersk seems to have given the
shipping business the largest amount of autonomy over the long term,
even though it still was part of a conglomerate. Maersk’s container ser-
vices largely remained outside the shipping conferences through which
the traditional operators sought to coordinate their activities and regulate
supply and prices. Maersk operated as an outsider competing on cost and
31Bott (2009, 155 and Chapters 12 and 13).
32See Martin Jes Iversen’s chapter in this volume.
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quality in a free market. OCL initially seemed to enjoy substantial auton-
omy, having been created as a new organization with the sole purpose
of becoming the dominant force in container shipping, unencumbered
by any responsibilities in the traditional liner business. Soon, however, it
became apparent that OCL as a joint venture had to follow a strategic
direction set by its four parent companies. By the mid-1980s, managers at
Ocean had come round to the view thatOCL required control over its own
affairs, and that they would have to either acquire sole ownership of the
container shipping consortium or (as they eventually did) sell their stake
in it.33 Another respect in which OCL’s autonomy was constrained by
the parent companies was that OCL always operated as a conference line.
Early on, it had been considered to run container services free from the
conferences and the ‘inhibitions and barriers’ they imposed, but Ocean’s
view that container services should be used for ‘strengthening the confer-
ence hold over shippers’ prevailed.34 In this case, corporate culture acted
as an internal constraint, restricting the options OCL would consider.
Like OCL, EAC was a conference line. EAC also was held back by
unhappy relationships, power struggles and miscommunication within
the alliances with other container lines that most operators believed were
necessary in order to be able to offer frequent sailings while also using large
ships. In another respect, however, EAC’s senior managers seem to have
had toomuch autonomy for their own good: at key points in the company’s
history, including the decisions to order the Liner ReplacementVessels and
to pour resources into gaining a foothold in the Chinese market, stronger
oversight and critical questioning of top-level strategic initiatives could
have prevented costly mistakes.
Entrepreneurial autonomy thus needs to be used wisely, in pursuit of a
strategy that is in tune with a company’s internal capabilities and with the
opportunities offered by the external environment. The strategy literature
insists that strategy does not necessarily have to imply the systematic pur-
suit of an elaborate long-termmaster plan; equally, it can emerge gradually
as a pattern of successful activity or manifest itself in the culture and skills
33Again following Bott (2009, 144, Chapters 12 and 13).
34Bott (2009, 86).
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that exist within an organisation.35 Sornn-Friese argues that Maersk pur-
sued just such an emergent strategy over much of their history, reacting
flexibly to business opportunities that presented themselves, while also sys-
tematically building up commercial and organizational capability. By the
mid-1980s, however, a more explicit strategy was chosen asMaersk set out
to become the world’s most profitable container operator through offering
customers the best possible integrated service. Ocean/OCL embraced for-
mal strategic planning with far more enthusiasm. However, the resulting
strict focus on business metrics such as profits and share price eventu-
ally led to the decision to reduce the company’s involvement in shipping
activities which seemed to offer inadequate returns, and to concentrate on
logistics services instead.36 EAC, as Iversen demonstrates, seems to have
pursued a succession of opportunistic moves. In terms of their time scales,
investment requirements and fundamental importance for the company,
both the LRV project and the work done in connection with container-
izing China’s trade were of strategic importance. They were undertaken
based on an assessment of long-term term trends in shipping markets and
in the global economy, required substantial investments and engaged the
future of the company. However, as so many company strategists found
out in the 1970s, perceived long-term trends could end abruptly or pro-
ceed through cycles of stops and starts, markets moved in unpredictable
swings and once resources had been committed to a failed initiative, they
were no longer available for anything else.
The ability to make and implement strategy is clearly one of the factors
explaining success and failure in the three cases presented here. However,
it is likely that EAC was handicapped not only by internal shortcomings
and flawed strategy but also by changes in the external environment that,
broadly speaking, devalued its strengths and highlighted its weaknesses.
For Maersk, the opposite was the case, while Ocean/OCL occupied a
middle ground. The external environment may be analyzed from a macro
perspective, with a focus on regimes of political economy and global trade.
From such a perspective, the liberalization of trade and investment, the
35Mintzberg et al. (1998).
36Barber (2003) offers a succinct analysis of Ocean’s and OCL’s strategic options.
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opening up of once closed economies—foremost among them China—
and the growth of non-Western industries and global supply chains are key
trends since the late 1970s. Freer trade and level playing fields both allowed
and rewarded the investments firms such asMaersk andOceanmade to set
up efficient, standardized, customer-focused, globally integrated logistics
networks. Firms with a focus on doing business in the cartel-like structures
of the conferences, such as Ocean and EAC, found the increased compe-
tition from non-conference lines difficult to deal with, whereas Maersk’s
experience of operating as an outsider firm was increasingly relevant as the
conferences eroded and the shipping world became more and more com-
petitive. Meanwhile, the local knowledge and political connections that
allowed a company such as EAC to navigate politicized markets in closed
economies were no longer of such crucial importance in an era of lib-
eralization. Borders, political economy and institutional regimes matter.
Changes in the external environment require firms to adapt and change;
however, such change was much easier where it could draw on existing
strengths and resources. Different company cultures and the weight of
past decisions—path dependency—go some way towards explaining the
varied experiences of the three companies in this respect.
A complementary perspective on the external environment would be
a local one. Maersk and EAC, along with the entire Danish maritime
industry, probably benefited from being important players in a small,
open European economy. They enjoyed political clout and social prestige
and were part of an industrial cluster whichmade it easy to recruit talented
people and exchange information. Ocean/OCL were located in the UK,
exposed to the erosion of colonial and Commonwealth economic ties,
to the decline of British industry and British long-distance trade and to
industrial unrest.The economic revival of the 1980s bypassed the shipping
sector, while capital market liberalization increased the pressure to achieve
short-term gains for shareholders and attracted promising youngmanagers
to careers in the City. All of this pointed to building Ocean’s future in
logistics rather than shipping.
Both on a local and on a global level, the factors that made for success
were linked to an ability to organize processes in networks of vessels, places,
systems and people. In the globalized free-trading world of the 1980s and
beyond this was a completely different challenge to what it had been over
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the middle decades of the twentieth century when the business of moving
goods by sea was governed by large numbers of political controls, tariffs,
quotas, capital controls and local idiosyncrasies which limited, but did not
eliminate, the ability of private firms to pursue truly global strategies and
to contribute to global economic integration. Once again, the relationship
between shipping and changes in the nation state is crucial.
Connections
Globalization transformed the relationship between countries and
between companies—new connections were forged and old ones were
transformed. The global nature of shipping demand put the industry in
a special position. Shipping companies could challenge the nation state
in ways and to a degree that would be difficult for companies in more
location-bound industries. We can call this development deterritorializa-
tion—the link between the economic activity and the national jurisdiction
was severed. Shipping entrepreneurs would transcend traditional borders,
and break free from national regulatory regimes, in their attempts at pro-
ducing shipping services as efficiently and as profitably as possible. This
was accomplished by creating a new international division of labour, where
countries, companies and workers reconstituted their positions within a
global system.
More than anyone else, Greek shipowners contributed to the reconfig-
uration of the global shipping industry, challenging the role of the nation
state and finding alternative ways of organizing their business. Among
these Greek pioneers, Aristotle Onassis was the first and foremost. As
the chapter by Harlaftis and Tsakas shows, he became one of the world’s
greatest shipowners by establishing a new institution: ‘the global shipping
company’.
Two factors enabled Onassis and the other Greeks to do this. First, their
‘home bias’ was limited, and it was primarily related to cultural, rather
than economic or financial, factors. Like the Norwegians before them,
the Greeks had built up their position within shipping as cross-traders,
fulfilling other countries’ transport needs, rather than transporting their
own imports and exports. Moreover, there was a long tradition of a Greek
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diaspora. These merchants and shipowners were originally based in the
Mediterranean and the Black Sea, but in the interwar and post-war periods
also located in leading metropolises such as London and New York.
The second factor that enabled the Greeks to build global companies
was their willingness to undertake organizational innovation—to do busi-
ness in new ways, which gave them a competitive advantage. The Greeks
managed to build up an international system where companies in differ-
ent countries played specific roles, while the Greek owners at the helm
oversaw the activities. By slicing up the value chain, and sourcing inputs
where the costs were low, high profits paved the way for further expansion.
As Gelina Harlaftis and Christos Tsakas show, owners such as Aristotle
Onassis and Stavros Niarchos pioneered ‘business beyond borders’. They
combined Greek entrepreneurship with customers and financing from
the United States and with German shipbuilding capacity. The corporate
model that enabled them to do this was ‘global’, with a complex legal struc-
ture, often impenetrable from the outside. Onassis was an international
man. He controlled hundreds of companies in different domiciles, often
‘offshore companies’ in countries with limited transparency. He registered
his ships in a number of countries, bothTraditionalMaritimeNations and
Flags of convenience. Organized in a strictly hierarchical manner, Onas-
sis’ companies in different jurisdictions all played special roles, for finance,
operation, management, agency or ownership. The basis of this model,
the element that made it viable and successful, was Aristotle Onassis and
his reputation.
The Greek experience illustrates the manner in which shipping chal-
lenged the nation state, utilizing resources from different countries and
creating or institutionalizing novel transnational systems. While shipping
companies in some countries gained competitive advantage by technolog-
ical innovation, the Greeks based their competitiveness on organizational
innovation.37 Important ingredients here were offshore companies and
Flags of convenience.
Flags of convenience were originally a refuge for owners that wanted
to escape strict domestic rules, double taxation and the effects of the
Prohibition. The Greeks refined the model, and today such flags have
37See Tenold and Theotokas (2013).
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become the dominant way of organizing vessel ownership. While the vast
majority of the world’s ships in 1900 was registered in Great Britain, the
United States and Germany, the leading flags today are Panama, Liberia
and the Marshall Islands.
In 1919 the Belen Quezada, a former US navy ship, became the first
foreign-owned vessel registered in Panama, often seen as the ‘original’ Flag
of convenience.38 Slightly less than a century later, the country became
the foremost example of tax evasion, greed and an uncontrollable global
financial architecture. The leaking of The Panama Papers, more than ten
million secret files from a lawyer’s office, showed how individuals and
businesses used offshore companies to avoid the regulations and restric-
tions of the nation state for personal gain. For many, The Panama Papers
provided the first glimpse of an economic system that was alien, a rogue
system where the nation state had been forced to play second fiddle. In
the press, the practice of ‘offshore holdings’ was linked to the increased
international flows of money, to technological improvements that made
it possible to distribute incomes and funds among different jurisdictions
in a rapid and concealed manner. While many of the businesses involved
in the inquiry were legitimate, the leak also revealed a surprisingly large
amount of suspicious actions by politicians, athletes and businessmen.
For shipping insiders, the practices that were revealed in connection with
The Panama Papers were neither new nor surprising. Shipping had tran-
scended borders for a long time. The globalized world—and the techno-
logical developments that have made this world possible—simply meant
that other industries were gradually catching up with shipping.
The new, global shipping regime that emerged on a large scale after
World War II was based on new connections, but this also implied that
some of the older connections were replaced. The link between (British)
shipowners and (British) shipyards, which had given both a dominant
position at the start of the twentieth century, was severed. Greek shipown-
ers helped the expansion of German yards in the 1950s and 1960s, and
they also embraced low-cost shipyards in Asia, contributing to the shift in
38See Carlisle (2009, 2017). In the slipstream of Belen Quezada came two American cruise ships,
encouraged by the owners’ desire to avoid being ‘dry’ during Prohibition. There were long traditions
for using foreign flags in times of war, and there had also been instances of ‘tactical registration’ in
foreign countries before this, see Tenold (2019, 38).
10 Conclusion 267
the shipbuilding industry. Similarly, the links between shipping compa-
nies and their home country—in terms of flag, labour and regulatory and
political regime—were cut with the advent of the global and transnational
shipping companies.
The majority of the chapters in this book treat shipping demand as
a global concept. One of our underlying theses is that the production of
shipping services afterWorldWar IIwas transformed fromanational frame
to a global or transnational frame, parallel with the increasing integration
of the international economy. However, René Taudal Poulsen’s analysis of
the ferry segment shows that this picture is not applicable to all parts of
the shipping industry.
The demand for ferry services has a clear national or regional com-
ponent and is a ‘remarkable exception’ to the global nature of maritime
transport. Consequently, competition and other market processes differ
from shipping in general. Focussing on the ferry market in the Nordic
countries, Taudal Poulsen shows how important political decisions might
be for shipping. For instance, the emergence of a common European mar-
ket and the termination of ‘duty free’ sales of alcohol and cigarettes clearly
reduced the attractiveness of short sea shipping. Similarly, the ‘opening
up of the skies’ and the growth of low-cost air carriers have provided
ferry companies with new types of competition. As such, the basis for the
decline of the European ferry market was different from the basis for the
decline of European shipping in general.
During the first decades of the post-war period, there was a ‘life cycle’
that ferries tended to go through.39 Starting their careers in the Nordic
countries, as the ferries aged they were sold on to lower-income markets
in the Mediterranean, then moved on to local markets in Africa and Asia
before the ship was scrapped. As a result of, among other things, high-
income growth in Asia and limited investment in new capacity in the
Nordic countries, this life cycle pattern has disappeared today. Due to the
fact that regional markets have become more similar, and the segment
has become mature, the previous connections in the market for second-
hand ships have been severed. As such, it is evident that globalization
39The existence of life cycles in shipping has been discussed in for instance Thanopoulou (1995).
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has influenced not only the global shipping segments, but also the locally
based ones.
Concluding Comments
This book has discussed the intimate relationship between shipping and
globalization in the post-war period. To some extent, the growth of the
shipping industry and the increased economic integration have been two
processes that have reinforced each other, two feedback loops.
The shipping industry has contributed to changing the centre of gravity
of the world economy. For instance, low and decreasing transport costs
have been a necessary condition for the integration of Asian countries
in the world economy to the extent that we see today. This pertains to
containerization and the low cost of moving manufactured goods from
Asia to markets in North America and Europe, but it is also a result of
the manner in which technological and organizational innovations have
lowered the cost of transporting inputs to Asia. Moreover, the growth of
Asian shipbuilding—with subsidies and political priority in Japan, South
Korea and China—has reduced the cost of the ships needed to produce
shipping services, and thus the cost of providing these services. This is the
first of our feedback loops—shifts in production and growing seaborne
trade pave the way for reductions in maritime transport costs, and these
cost reductions encouraged trade and division of labour.
The shipping industry has also been a frontrunner in the development
of ‘global companies’, organizations that have challenged the role of the
nation state in the search for lower costs. Such companies were originally
the preserve of shipowners from a handful of countries—Greece and the
United States in particular.However, as it is difficult to regulate an industry
that primarily operates outside national borders, the liberal regime spread
from country to country. The detrimental market conditions during the
shipping crises of the 1970s and 1980s implied that countries were forced
to liberalize, or see their shipping activities disappear.
Today, the majority of the shipping companies operating in the interna-
tional market have a high degree of autonomy in questions of localization,
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and there has been a levelling of tax policies and of registration require-
ments. This is the second of our feedback loops—when shipowners from
one country challenge the regulatory regime, other countries are forced
to follow, as the alternative is that their ‘own’ shipowners lose competi-
tiveness. This exodus triggers further pressure on countries trying to avoid
liberalization.
The two feedback loops reflect how shipping has become more global,
but the industry still has an important national dimension. Port states still
maintain an element of autonomy and authority, and many Traditional
Maritime Nations still benefit from having a business culture that pro-
motes maritime activities. Moreover, it is easier to uphold a regulatory
regime with regard to coastal transports and short sea shipping, a topic
that we have not discussed in detail in this book.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the shipping industry
reflected the primacy of Western Europe and North America, and the
political and economic linkages on which this hegemony was built. Today,
the shipping industry reflects the global nature of international economic
relations. It reflects the constant search for cost reductions in the sourcing
of raw materials, and in the production of goods and services.
Shipping is crucial for the smooth functioning of the world economy.
It is mainly in the rare instances where this part of the global production
system does not perform optimally—for instance when the South Korean
container operator Hanjin was facing bankruptcy and their ships were
left at sea—that ships and shipping gets any mainstream attention. The
maritime transport system that has emerged since World War II is both
an important engine—and an important example—of globalization.
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